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Leidschrift, jaargang 28, nummer 1, april 2013 
As the founder of the modern Turkish state Mustafa Kemal Atatürk said in 
1933: 
 
Today, the Soviet Union is our friend, neighbor and ally. We need 
this friendship. But no one can know what may happen tomorrow. 
Just like the Ottoman, and the Austro-Hungarian empires, they may 
also be disintegrated, split. The nations they are holding with an iron 
grip today, may slip away. The world may attain a new balance. Then, 
Turkey must know what to do. We have brothers under the rule of 
this friend, with whom we share the same language, faith, and origin. 
We must be prepared to embrace them. How does a nation prepare 
such an endeavor? By maintaining strong spiritual bridges. Language 
is a bridge. Faith is a bridge. History is a bridge. We need to go back 
to our roots, and reconstruct what history has divided. We cannot 
wait for them to approach us. We must reach out to them.1 
 
Currently, Turkey is stressing cultural, origin, ethnic and linguistic affinities 
among ‘Turkic’2 peoples. As Central Asia has an important strategic role for 
China’s political stability, this ‘pan-Turkism’ has the potential to undermine 
China’s comprehensive security, a part of which is peaceful development.  
This article examines this Turkish influence projection towards 
Central Asia and Caucasus regions after the shaking geopolitical change of 
the Soviet Union’s collapse. It will focus on the influence not only by the 
Turkish state, but also by businesses, social movements and networks. The 
aspects of non-governmental movements (especially Fetullah Gülen’s 
movement) and the role of organizations in Turkish influence projection are 
shown: their grassroots work, and the potential of spreading ideology 
among peoples, educating the elitist youth. How can this influence the 
                                                     
1  A.M. Koknar, ‘Turkey’s Security Relations in Central Asia’ in: A. Cohen ed., 
Eurasia in Balance: the US and the Regional Power Shift (Burlington 2005) 101-126: 122. 
2 Denoting a large group of closely related Altaic languages and people of Western 






political environment in Central Asia already in the next generation? The 
implications thereof for China are discussed towards the end of this article. 
 
 
The role of the state 
 
Turkey has been cited as an important actor because of its strong historical, 
cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties with the newly independent states of 
Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan. Thus, the positive role Turkey might play in this region has 
been extensively discussed, not only within Turkey but also in the West, 
where people fear that radical Islam might fill the power vacuum that 
occurred in the region with the demise of the Soviet Union led to strong 
encouragement to these newly independent states to adopt a ‘Turkish 
model’ of secular democracy with a liberal economy.3  
The new Turkic cooperation was supposed to bring about further 
Turkish growth and development, to enhance its regional influence, and to 
increase Turkey’s international standing in the eyes of its Western allies. At 
the first Turkic summit in Ankara (30-31 October 1992), Turgut Ozal4 
captured the spirit of the moment well. In his inaugural speech, he 
announced that ‘if we can exploit this historic opportunity in the best 
possible way, if we do not make any mistake, the twenty-first century will be 
the century of the Turks.’5  
However, Turkey has been confronted by serious obstacles in 
extending its sphere of influence. It is cut off from the new Turkish world, 
except for a few miles of common border – a bridge, in fact – with 
Nakhichevan, an Azeri enclave in Armenia. Between Nakhichevan and 
Azerbaijan lies Zangezur, which borders with Iran and separates Turkey 
from other Turkic countries. By the ‘Agreement Respecting the Fixation of 
the Frontier between Persia and Turkey with Exchange of Notes’, signed at 
                                                     
3 M. Aydin, ‘Between Euphoria and Realpolitik: Turkish Policy toward Central Asia 
and Caucasus’ in: T.Y. Ismael and M. Aydin, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first 
Century: A Changing Role in World Politics (London 2003) 139-160: 139.  
4 Prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and president from 1989 to 1993. 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/437131/Turgut-Ozal, accessed 9 
May 2012. 
5  D. Jung and W. Poccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater 
Middle East (London 2001) 180. 




Teheran (23 January 1932), Turkey exchanged some territory in the Bajirke 
and Qotur areas and gained a boundary with Nakhijevan.6 It was to solve 
border differences, but it was also one more step towards establishing 
ground connections with Turkic countries. Problems arose, while they were 
thinking about this southern part of Armenia to have ground connections 
with Azerbaijan, Karabakh (Arcakh).7 
Although initially cultural, linguistic and religious affinities were the 
stimulating factors for forging closer ties, Ankara’s new attitude towards 
Central Asia and the Caucasus has been based more on pragmatic economic 
and foreign policy considerations than on simple nationalist rhetoric or 
sentimental concerns. Turkey’s responsibilities, as understood by the then 
Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, meant that Turkey could, and indeed 
should, play a dynamic role in connecting the newly independent Central 
Asian and Caucasian states to the rest of the world, and help them in their 
quest for an identity. This role also included efforts towards regional 
cooperation through such organizations as BSEC8 and ECO.9 
At another level, Turkey also expected to gain major economic 
benefits from the development of closer ties with the new Central Asian 
republics, which were seen as promising by a growing Turkish industry. In 
fact, the Turkish private sector, with heavy backing from the government, 
had moved extensively to exploit the region’s economic potential. At the 
same time, there was also the expectation that Turkey would become 
politically more important in regional and global politics because of its 
cultural and ethnic links with the region’s large Turkic populations, which 
were undergoing profound political changes.10  
                                                     
6 L.M. Alexander, ‘Iran – Turkey Boundary, International Boundary Study’, The 
Geographer Office of the Geographer Bureau of Intelligence and Research 28 (1964) 1-9. 
7 Y. Djerejian, Pan-Turkism (Beirut 1998) 71.  
8 The BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization) was founded on June 
25, 1992, and is comprised of Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece. 
http://www.photius.com/bsec/bsec.html#ABOUT, accessed 3 April 2012. 
9 The ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) is an intergovernmental regional 
organization established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of 
promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation among the Member States. 
In 1992, the Organization was expanded to include seven new members: Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Republic of Uzbekistan. 





After recognizing the newly independent Turkic republics, Ankara 
started to establish institutions to develop relations with those republics and 
encouraged businessmen, universities, and artists to do so too. Direct air 
connections and satellite broadcast links have been established. To facilitate 
these activities and to coordinate the flow of assistance to these areas, the 
Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA) was established in 
Ankara in January 1992. TIKA was an agency within the Foreign Ministry 
with its own budget and staff, created in order to provide technical and 
cultural support to the newly independent Turkic republics. As TIKA 
President Hakan Fidan acknowledges, Turkey ‘took advantage of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Yugoslavia to initiate 
projects that reach out to the countries Turkey could not communicate with 
during the Cold War.’ 11  In May 1999, TIKA was moved to the prime 
minister’s office and restructured. The agency now works not only towards 
the Turkic republics, but is also involved in 37 other countries. During the 
period 2005-2009, around seven billion USD of resources were channeled 
to TIKA through public and private sources. 12  Turkey also had direct 
involvement abroad, establishing and financing two universities in Turkic 
republics, one in Kazakhstan, and one in Kyrgyzstan. The Akhmet Yasawi 
Turkish-Kazak University was founded in 1994 in Turkestan in southern 
Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan-Turkey Manas University opened in 1996 in 
Bishkek. Both universities are financed by Turkey.13   
A greater Turkish role in the region was favored by the West as a 
counter-weight against the ambitions of Iran to influence the region. The 
fear that the vacuum left by the collapse of Soviet Communism could lead 
to Islamic fundamentalism becoming the politically dominant force among 
the Muslims of Central Asia led to the West’s promotion of Turkey as a 
Muslim, yet secular and democratic model for development. As a result of 
growing self confidence about its potential and political support in the West, 
Turkey felt ready to take advantage of the new economic and political 
                                                     
11 http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/Turkish_International_Cooperation_and
_Development_Agency_, accessed 17 April 2012. 
12 However, it is likely that the amounts directed to the new Turkic republics were 
not that large, since the agency has been more involved in the Balkans, Middle East 
and Africa from 2002 onwards. See: N. Devlet, ‘Taking Stock: Turkey and the 
Turkic World 20 Years Later’, The German Marshall Fund of the United States 
(November 10, 2011) 1-4: 2. 
13 Ibidem, 3.  




opportunities when the new states emerged from the former Soviet Union. 
Cultural and economic protocols were exchanged, and in a direct and 
unprecedented challenge to Russian interests in the region, the then Turkish 
prime minister Demirel spoke of the possibility of establishing a ‘Union of 
Turkic States’, and suggested that Central Asia might be better off away 
from the Ruble Zone.14  
The Turkish model of development is the common reference point. 
Effusive statements have been made about the Turkish role. Its Avrasia TV 
satellite broadcasts are watched each day by audiences throughout Central 
Asia and Azerbaijan. The Turkish modified Latin alphabet and technical 
standards are on offer as the most suitable. In Azerbaijan and elsewhere, 
Turkey waged – and, in December 1991, won – an alphabet war with Iran 
and Saudi Arabia to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin instead of 
the Arabic one. Extremist circles in Turkey dream not of mere influence, 
but of a pan-Turkic empire in which Ankara would extend its power over a 
vast region of Central Asia. This vision, though, has no official backing in 
Ankara. President Turgut Ozal was quick to repudiate the claim of one of 
his ministers, Ercument Konukman, in January 1990 that ‘several states in 
the Soviet Union and in China will be under the Turkish flag in the next 
century.’15  
For obvious geographical reasons, Azerbaijan forms the principal link 
between Turkey and Central Asia. As soon as Azerbaijan became 
independent in 1991, the leaders of the republic established close relations 
with Turkey in order to receive technical and cultural assistance, and to 
counterbalance the Russian influence. Relations between Azerbaijan and 
Turkey became even more intense after the 1992 election victory of Abulfaz 
Elcibey, the Popular Front candidate. Elcibey promised that the country of 
Atatürk would participate fully in the exploitation of Azerbaijani oil wealth 
– for which Turkey had already fought during the First World War. 
Turkey also discussed the possibility of providing military training to 
the regional countries, actively advocated building gas and oil pipelines 
through Turkey to market the Caspian energy resources, and encouraged 
the adoption of the Turkish – that is Latin – alphabet for all the Turkic 
states. By mid-1992 Turkey had made a bold bid for leadership and 
                                                     
14 Aydin, ‘Between Euphoria and Realpolitik’, 141. 
15 A. Hyman, ‘Moving out of Moscow’s Orbit: The Outlook for Central Asia’, 





influence in the region in political, financial, cultural, military, and economic 
areas. Nevertheless, the region presented important challenges for Turkey.16  
 
 
The Fetullah Gülen movement 
 
While discussing the spreading process of Turkish influence, one can’t 
avoid mentioning the role of the Fetullah Gülen movement, although it is 
not a governmental actor. Regarding the movement’s business interests, 
many commentators suspect strong lines of patronage between the present 
AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) government and the Gülen movement. It is 
an Islamic-based movement which has sought to combine a modern 
interpretation of Islam with Turkish nationalism and statism. Taking its 
roots from the movement of the prominent Kurdish religious authority Said 
Nursi (1877-1961), the ‘neo-Nurcu’ movement of Fethullah Gülen is an 
important force, with its powerful presence in the media and its network of 
schools in Turkey, Central Asia and the Balkans.  
President Turgut Ozal’s economic and political liberalization 
accelerated the formation and expansion of new alternative social, cultural 
and economic public spaces. 17  The market economy and the spread of 
democratization have led to an unprecedented Islamization of the public 
sphere. Islamic foundations, associations and publishing houses are urging 
Muslims to become more involved in social and political activities and to 
control their own lives. The activities of Islamic groups are setting new 
coordinates in the public sphere. The neo-Nurcus allow more freedom of 
debate and criticism in their journals, radios, television stations, and 
newspapers than most other Kemalist and Islamist groups. However, they 
do this only within the coordinates of the teachings of Anatolian Islam, i.e., 
Islamo-Turkish nationalism.  
New alternative spaces and associations have served to empower 
Islamic groups in Turkey. Muslim groups have used these alternative spaces 
to create their own ‘parallel society’, where they can express their opinion to 
attract culturally and economically excluded groups. For instance, 
deregulation of broadcasting has empowered Islamic voices to express 
themselves on diverse radio stations, television channels, magazines and 
                                                     
16 Aydin, ‘Between Euphoria and Realpolitik’, 143. 
17 H. Yavuz, ‘Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fetullah 
Gülen’, Middle East Journal 53.4 (1999) 584-605: 585. 




newspapers. Moreover, a growing Anatolian bourgeoisie, commonly called 
the ‘Anatolian tigers’ has formed its own association, Mussiad (Mustakil 
Sanayici ve Iz Adamlari Dernegi; Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association). MUSIAD was formed by those economically excluded from 
TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association), a 
powerful and pro-state business association. Some secular groups claim that 
the ‘M’ of MUSIAD stands for Muslim rather than mustakil (independent). 
Indeed, many of the members do not hesitate to present their organization 
as an association of Muslim businessmen. 
The emphasis on spirituality in Gülen’s thinking is partly explained 
by his attachment to Turkey’s ‘folk Islam’: Sufism. Specifically, Gülen 
derives inspiration from the writings of Said Nursi, whose Nur movement 
(active from the 1920s to the 1980s) was similarly distinguished by its 
advocacy of reason, progress, and tolerance, and its quietism towards direct 
political involvement.18  
Gülen prefers to draw inspiration from the Ottoman model of state-
society relationships. Although the empire’s rulers were guided by their faith, 
the Ottoman system of governance was not theocratic. Public laws were 
formulated on the basis of the state’s needs rather than in accordance with 
Islamic law (sharia). 19  Gülen is first and foremost a Turko-Ottoman 
nationalist. His nationalism is an inclusive one that is not based on blood or 
race but rather on shared historical experiences and the agreement to live 
together within one polity.20 This cultural revival of Islamic circles in Turkey 
seeks to criticize the present Kemalist project and its future orientation by 
reconstructing the past of the Turko-Muslim community. By reimagining 
the cultural content of the Turkish nation, the Islamic groups present the 
political nation as Muslim, Ottoman and Turkish. The politics of 
nationalism in Turkey have been gradually embedded in the politics of 
culture. There is an attempt to ‘free’ the definition of the nation from the 
statist elite. One of the major effects of the politics of culture is the 
reconceptualization of the nation, and its cultural connection with Central 
Asia and the Balkans. A large segment of the population has celebrated and 
supported Gülen’s conception of national identity as Muslim, Ottoman and 
Turkish. The politics of nationalism in Turkey have been gradually 
                                                     
18 B. Park, ‘The Fetullah Gulen Movement’, The Middle East Review of International 
Affairs 12.3 (2008) 1-11: 2. 
19 Ibidem, 2.  





embedded in the politics of culture. There is an attempt to ‘free’ the 
definition of the nation from the statist elite. One of the major effects of 
the politics of culture is the reconceptualization of the nation, and its 
cultural connection with Central Asia and the Balkans. To feel one’s identity 
for many Nurcus is to feel a religio-historical emotion, without reifying it. 
Emotional aspects of identity are not fixed into a single concept, as an 
emotional state remains a fluid process.  
Gülen states that there is no necessary contradiction between Islam 
and modernity. Indeed, according to Gülen, Turkish Islam’s more adaptable 
and less doctrinal Sufi traditions have enabled Turkey, with its 
democratization, free market economy, and secular political system, to 
incorporate aspects of modernity barely found elsewhere in the Muslim 
world. A key to his thinking is that Islam should positively embrace science, 
reason, democratization, and tolerance. It should not shield itself from 
other ideas, or from scientific and technological progress. Gülen believes 
that the relative economic and moral poverty of so much of the Islamic 
world is explained by its attachment to misplaced and dogmatic 
interpretations of Islam, not Islam per se. He argues that Turkey can lead 
the Islamic world toward this realization, and for all his proclaimed 
universalism there is also a pronounced ‘Turkishness’ to his thinking. 
Turkish society is nationalistic, and some of this flavor has been absorbed 
by Gülen and Fetullahchi.21  
For Gülen, the key to Islam’s adaptation to the modern world does 
not lie in direct political activity and organization. Instead, he propagates a 
kind of ‘educational Islamism’, as opposed to a ‘political Islamism’. New 
prominent religious and highly educated people, a ‘Golden Generation’, 
should be cultivated and encouraged to dedicate their lives to the service 
(hizmet) of the people and to inspire them towards the movement’s 
objectives.22  
Gülen’s community is based on a complex web of business networks 
and controls a large media empire. Initially benefitting from some protective 
cover from Prime Minister Turgut Ozal – reckoned to be a sympathizer – 
the movement has opened around two hundred schools in Turkey since it 
first was established in 1982. Furthermore, universities such as Fatih in 
Istanbul, hospitals, charities, a television channel (Samanyolu TV) and a 
radio station (Burc FM) have been established by the movement. It owns 
                                                     
21 Park, ‘The Fetullah Gulen Movement’, 2.  
22 Ibidem, 2.  




Sizinti (a scientific monthly), Ekoloji (an environment-related magazine), 
Yeni Umit (a theological journal), Aksiyon (a weekly magazine), Zaman (a 
daily newspaper) and The Fountain (English language religious 
publication).23 In 1996 it established a bank, Asya Finans, operating on the 
basis of Islamic principles such as interest-free banking and initially tasked 
to raise investment funds for the newly-independent Turkic republics. Its 
activities are now extensive and global. It is backed by sixteen partners and 
has over half a billion USD in capital. Moreover, a powerful association of 
businessmen, ISHAD (Iş Hayati Dayanişma Dernegi; Business Life Solidarity 
Association’), which includes over two thousand businessmen and 
merchants, supports Gülen’s educational activities. This infrastructure also 
includes universities and colleges, high schools, dormitories, summer camps, 
and over a hundred foundations. Day-to-day activities are organized by a 
hierarchical management based on the tenets of trust, obedience and duty to 
the community. 24  The network also spawned a Journalists and Writers 
Foundation (largely to facilitate dialogue activities), and a Teachers 
Foundation, each of which publishes journals and organizes symposiums 
and conferences – frequently abroad – and provides an umbrella for a host 
of dialogue groups and charitable organizations.25  
This structure is composed of businessmen, teachers, journalists, and 
students. Gülen is well aware of the opportunities available in a free market 
economy. His philosophy, therefore, is very much in tune with this growing 
business community. He stresses education and engagement in the market 
economy. Gülen’s activities are aimed at molding a cohesive and disciplined 
community through education, mass media, and financial networks.26 
Although revenues raised by school fees are often used to enable 
access by less-privileged students, it remains an inescapable fact that the 
movement’s educational model is elitist. In Turkey this is contributing to 
the creation of a parallel and Gülen-inspired elite. In post-communist 
Central Asia (the main location of Gülen’s overseas educational activities), 
successful applicants are usually the children of either the wealthy or 
government officials.  
The Gülen movement eludes definition. Deeply Turkish, it is globally 
engaged. It is apolitical, yet constitutes an existential political threat to 
                                                     
23 Yavuz, ‘Towards an Islamic Liberalism?’, 585. 
24 Ibidem, 585.  
25 Park, ‘The Fetullah Gulen Movement’, 4. 





Turkey’s officially secularist order, not least through its penetration of the 
state’s machinery. It is opposed by a Kemalist state, yet it enhances Turkey’s 
‘soft power’: its external trade and its pan-Turkic links. Espousing 
democracy and openness, it remains secretive and publicity-shy. Spiritually 
based, it is extremely wealthy. More of a unifying set of values than an 
organization perhaps, its tentacles expand relentlessly nevertheless.27 
Under the current AKP administration, a number of business groups 
owned by avowed members of the movement has grown rapidly with the 
help of state contracts and concessions. ISHAD is another key organization 
for fostering the movement’s business ties – particularly in countries other 
than Turkey. ISHAD members are reputed to provide the main sources of 
funding for the movement.28  
Gülen seeks to prevent ‘emotional alienation’ among the Turkic-
Muslim youth by establishing the missing link between the Turkic-Ottoman 
communities and God. He stresses the role of natural sciences to prevent 
the fragmentation and alienation caused by skepticism. Therefore, the neo-
Nurcu education system seeks to discover the attributes of nature to 
consolidate faith in God. According to Gülen, a lack of religious education 
would create atheism whereas the lack of scientific education would result 
in fanaticism. Gülen’s schools promote patriotism and a common religio-
historical consciousness for the Turkic youth. Financial supporters are 
regularly invited to visit the schools and explore investment opportunities in 
Central Asia. These conservative businessmen usually prefer to fund 
schools in Central Asia because of their commitment to Gülen’s Turko-
Islamic worldview. The teachers of these schools in Central Asia usually 
come from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, or from Bogazi 
University in Istanbul. They believe that they have a mission to fulfill, just 
like missionaries. However, the Nurcu teachers are not only seeking to 
deliver God.  
These Nurcu education networks are closely connected to 
conservative business circles. The combination of business interests with 
Gülen’s ideas is powerful both inside and outside Turkey. These networks, 
despite claims of a central organization and a strict hierarchy, are rather 
loose networks of like-minded Turks, whose similar ideas are a result of 
                                                     
27 Park, ‘The Fetullah Gülen Movement’, 11. 
28  I.B. Gözaydin, ‘The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Politics in Turkey: A 
Chance for Democratization or a Trojan Horse?’, Democratization 16.6 (2009) 1214-
1236: 1219. 




their internalization of the writings of Said Nursi. Students in Gülen’s high 
schools in Turkey consistently achieve superior results on university exams. 
Although these schools do a much better job than state schools, they still 
stress memorization and conservative values more than critical thinking. 
Gülen’s educational system does not necessarily promote free will and 
individualism, but rather promotes a collective consciousness. The schools 
are less likely to encourage self-reflection and self-realization of individual 
potentials.29 
Gülen’s notion of politics can not be considered liberal, since he 
gives priority to the community and the state over individual rights. 
Although Gülen makes political and social claims on the basis of religious 
distinctions, these are not based on mutual respect and responsibility to 
other political and gender-based communities. Further, he hardly questions 
the oppressive policies of the Turkish state. It is, therefore, difficult to 
consider Gülen’s project either liberal or democratic. Rather, it is a hybrid 
communitarian movement rooted in Turko-Islamic tradition. However, in 
comparison with the elitist and socially exclusive nature of Turkish 
intellectual life, Gülen, as a religious leader, is fairly tolerant of ‘others’ and 
is open to dialogue with all groups in order to promote civility in Turkey. 
The Nurcu movement of Fethullah Gülen has reconciled itself with 
democracy and secularism without becoming either democratic or fully 
secular.30  
During a summit in Nakhchevan, Azerbaijan, in 2009, participating 
leaders decided to create a Council of Cooperation of Turkish Speaking 
States (CCTS) with its headquarters in Istanbul. In addition to this, 
TÜRKPA 31  (Turkish Speaking Countries Parliamentarian Assembly); 
TÜRKSOY32 (Joint Administration of Turkic Arts and Culture), which has 
                                                     
29 Yavuz, ‘Towards an Islamic Liberalism?’, 598.  
30 Ibidem, 600.  
31 TÜRKPA was established on 21 November 2008, according to the Agreement 
signed by the Heads of parliaments of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and the Republic of Turkey in the ‘Dolmabakhche 
Saray’ in Istanbul. http://www.turk-pa.org/cat.php?cat=2023&lang=en, accessed 
16 May 2012. 
32 TÜRKSOY was established in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, on 12 July 1993, by the 
Ministers of Culture of the newly independent five Turkic republics: Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, together with Republic of 






its headquarters in Ankara; and the Turkish Academy with its seat in Astana, 
Kazakhstan, were all integrated into the Turkish Council. This new 
organization had its first summit in Almaty on 21 October 2011, and 
discussed economic cooperation amongst its members.33  
Turkey entered the summit with rather ambitious expectations such 
as the establishment of a common market, the foundation of a Turkic 
development and investment bank, and firm pledges from Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to build oil and gas pipelines via Turkey. 
However, the first multilateral meeting of the presidents of the six Turkic 
republics resulted in a vaguely worded declaration that did not entail any 
specific commitments but only loose political statements.34  
It would not be correct to say that spreading Turkish influence in the 
region went smooth all the time. For example, during the 1990s, Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov cracked down on the movement’s activities in his 
country, including a ban on the distribution of Zaman. The movement has 
minimal presence there today. 35  In 2005, Turkish teaching staff at the 
Islamic theology school at a university in Turkmenistan was sacked by the 
country’s autocratic leader President Saparmurat Niazov. It seems that the 
Turkmen regime was becoming increasingly unhappy about both the pan-
Turkic and Islamic ideology of the Gülen network in the country.36 It may 
be that present leaders don’t want any strong influence from any side and 
are keeping all the options open for cooperation with other countries 
interested in the region. But the point here is that the elitist youth’s 
education is under Turkish influence. Gülen’s schools already represent 
around ten percent of Central Asia’s education systems, and it could be that 
– in a tacit partnership with the Turkish state – the movement’s activities 
will over the longer term intensify the emotive and material bonds between 
Turkic peoples – or their elites – and states. The Gülen network’s Central 
Asian elites could in time take on the forms of their Turkish counterparts, 
thereby encouraging the emergence of a pan-Turkic world linked by 
overlapping and fused identities. This could in turn ease the development of 
economic interactions, and even encourage closer state-to-state 
relationships. Such an evolution would not quite correspond with the kind 
of ‘Turkish model’ that Ankara’s secularists have sometimes hoped to be 
                                                     
33 Devlet, ‘Taking Stock: Turkey and the Turkic World’, 3.  
34 Jung and Poccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads, 180. 
35 Park, ‘The Fetullah Gulen Movement’, 8.  
36 Ibidem, 8.  




adopted in Central Asia, but it might dovetail with the pan-Turkic 
aspirations of nationalist elements in Turkey.37  
In order to expand its political, economic and cultural ties with the 
Turkic republics, Turkey launched a series of initiatives, particularly in 
promoting a variety of educational and cultural programs in Central Asia 
and Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is possible to argue, that following the phase 
of euphoria, Turkey’s foreign policy in the region has been characterized by 
a major emphasis on cultural and economic relations, rather than on 
political ones. There has been a clear shift in Ankara’s policy from the initial 
multilateral to a more bilateral approach in dealing with the former Soviet 
republics. 
Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu argued in his book 
Strategic Depth (2000) that Turkey possesses ‘strategic depth’ due to its 
history and geographic position and lists Turkey among a small group of 
countries which he calls ‘central powers’. Turkey should not be content with 
a regional role in the Balkans or the Middle East, because it is not a regional 
but a central power. Hence, it should aspire to play a leading role in several 




Recent tangible activity among Turkish speaking countries 
 
Among the newly independent states of Central Asia, the pan-Turkic 
sentiment is most pronounced in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s most ardent 
support of closer Turkic ties is Nizami Jafarov, director of Baku’s Ataturk 
Center, a corresponding member of Azerbaijan’s Academy of Science, and 
head of the Azerbaijani Permanent Parliamentary Commission on the 
Culture of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He noted that the integration process 
of the Turkic peoples has recently accelerated: ‘Closing is easier via culture. 
This is a sphere where no diplomatic problems may emerge.’ A new TV 
channel will focus on culture and history of the Turkic world, present 
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common cultural technologies and propagandize modern culture. Jafarov 
noted that the channel will broadcast the single Turkic language, close to 
Turkish. The deputy considers it expedient to dislocate the head office of 
the TV channel in Istanbul. There is also a plan to open offices in all Turkic 
countries.39 
President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan’s President Roza Otunbaeva and 
Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguli Berdimuhammedov were in 
attendance at the summit hosted by Turkish President Abdullah Gül. 
During the summit, the leaders agreed to appoint Turkish diplomat Halil 
Akinci as the first Secretary-General who would officially assume his 
responsibilities following the entering into force of the Nakhchivan 
Agreement.40 On 21 October 2011, the Turkic Business Council held a first 
meeting in Almaty.41 
The leaders also agreed to establish the Turkic Speaking States 
Business Council in order to foster economic cooperation and decided to 
explore the possibility of the establishment of the Turkic Speaking States’ 
Development Bank in Istanbul and a joint Insurance Company in order to 
support development of non-oil sectors and create new opportunities for 
private sector. The first summit of Turkic Speaking Countries Cooperation 
Council was held in Kazakhstan in 2011 and Kyrgyzistan hosted the second 
summit in 2012. 
‘Turkic countries should create a visa-free travel zone to enhance 
connections and trade’, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said 
following the signing of an agreement to lift visa restrictions between 
Turkey and Kyrgyzstan. ‘Turkish citizens will be able to visit Kyrgyzstan 
with their passports without a need for visas and vice versa. The trucks of 
our countries will be able to travel [across borders] more easily from now 
on,’ Erdoğan told reporters at a press conference with visiting Kyrgyz 
Prime Minister Almazbek Atambaev.42 
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Following eighteen years of delay, the summit of Turkic-speaking 
countries, based on solidarity and cooperation, passed a landmark threshold 
for institutionalization. The first such summit was held in 1992 at the 
initiative of then-Turkish President Turgut Özal. Uzbekistan, which has not 
been represented at the presidential level at any summit since 1998, and was 
not even represented at a low level during this İstanbul summit.43 The joint 
statement was signed in the Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkish 
languages. 
The summit emphasized that the International Turkic Culture 
Organization (TURKSOY) performs an important task in identification, 
enrichment, expansion and promotion of the common values and in 
deepening cultural relation among Turkic speaking states and peoples.44  
Such contemporary developments of integration processes among 
Turkic-speaking states as the establishment of TÜRKSOY in June 1993, an 
intergovernmental organization (CCTS) in October 2009, and TÜRKPA in 
January 2010, illustrate the fastening of integration processes, which Turkey 
did not achieve in the early 1990s.  
 
 
Implications for China 
 
In contemporary international relations China’s rapid economic 
development is a hot topic and is discussed widely in academic circles in the 
United States, China and elsewhere. Questions arise whether it is going to 
be peaceful, if it poses a threat for the countries in the region and for the 
United States. How will the U.S. respond if China surpasses the U.S. 
economically, and how will that influence China’s military intentions? Will 
China seek to become a new hegemon in the international system, and 
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could this power transition be peaceful? In these entangled developments 
the key point for China, as an emerging superpower, is economic 
development. To assure this, internal and border stability is crucial for 
China. 
A strong economic base could enable China to achieve a truly global 
power status in the twenty-first century, which represents a way to achieve 
comprehensive security. Given the importance of domestic stability for 
China’s peaceful development, and taking into account that the Xinjiang 
region’s Uyghur population has Turkic origins and shares cultural, ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic commonness with the Turks of Turkey and the rest 
of the Central Asian Turkic populations, what tentative threat does Pan-
Turkism represent for China’s comprehensive security? 
One of the key goals of Chinese foreign policy is to assure stability 
around its borderline and to convince its neighboring countries and the 
world that its intentions are peaceful. China’s official stated foreign policy 
doctrine is that of a ‘peaceful rise’, a concept that has its roots in Deng 
Xiaoping’s 24 Character Strategy in the 1990s: ‘observe calmly, secure our 
position; cope with our affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; 
be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.’ In the 
early years of the twenty-first century, the term peaceful rise was officially 
coined by an advisor to President Hu Jintao and summed up by Premier 
Wen Jiabao in Spring 2004, which was replaced the same year by a ‘peaceful 
development’ doctrine. In September 2005, Hu proposed building a 
‘harmonious world’ in his speech given at the summit conference 
commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United 
Nations. This all illustrates how essential stability and peace are for China’s 
development. 
Pan-Turkism’s main ideological bearer and promoter is Turkey, 
which gained a historical opportunity in this sense after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, when the road opened to the southern Caucasus and Central 
Asia. Since Pan-Turkism emphasizes the commonness of origins, language, 
religion, and culture of all Turkic peoples and aims to unify all those 
peoples, it could be a tentative latent threat for China’s comprehensive 
security. Extending Pan-Turkism to the Uyghur could stir up extremist, 
separatist, and terrorist actions in Xinjiang, which has the potential to cause 
a chain reaction in China and destabilize it from within. In this way, Central 
Asia is considered China’s strategic backyard. 
 






Turkish governmental as well as non-governmental movements and 
organizations have played a big role on a grassroots level in promoting 
common Islamic and Turkic-patriotic values in Central Asian countries. 
One of them, the Fetulah Gülen’s movement, promotes patriotism and a 
common religio-historical consciousness for the Turkic youth. They educate 
the elitist youth, which is very likely to become the next generation elite in 
these Central Asian countries. Those elites can play a large role in the pan-
Turkic political and economic integration process, which is now taking 
place.  
Although the Gülen schools represent around ten percent of Central 
Asia’s education systems, it could be that – in a tacit partnership with the 
Turkish state – the movement’s activities will over the longer term intensify 
the emotive and material bonds between Turkic peoples and states. The 
Gülen network’s Central Asian elites could in time take on the forms of 
their Turkish counterparts, thereby encouraging the emergence of a pan-
Turkic world linked by overlapping and fused identities. 
Pan-Turkism’s important particularity is counting on the great 
powers’ interests in global confrontation, as in world conflicts or systemic 
weakening of Russia, Iran and China a chance appears to realize Turkey’s 
and Pan-Turkism’s aspirations. Turkey’s leadership and Pan-Turkists’ 
leaders always make corrections in their activity tactics based on the 
specifics of international relations’ current circumstances and their own 
experiences.  
Separatism, extremism, and terrorism among the ethnic minorities 
along China’s northwestern frontiers pose a tentative threat, and the 
Chinese  see a long term threat to their security interests from Islamic 
fundamentalism and possibly pan-Turkism. The SCO (Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization) is considered as a mechanism for combating 
‘the three evil forces’ and promoting economic and security cooperation 
with Central Asian countries, which gives some leverages for China to 
prevent any outside help to ‘East Turkestan’ movement from Central Asia.  
The question to what extent Central Asia relates to pan-Turkism is 
considered in pan-Turkism ideology: shared historical origins, cultural 
affinities, linguistic similarities and religion. Gradually, step by step, this 
Turkic unity is being realized by Turkish governmental and non-
governmental organizations. 
